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RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER EMBRYO ALLOCATION
UPON DIVORCE: A NEED FOR A HYBRID
APPROACH BY ILLINOIS COURTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Embryo disposition upon divorce or separation of the parties
presents a wealth of legal issues to be addressed by the courts. Embryo cryopreservation,1 which occurs subsequent to the process of invitro fertilization2 (IVF), has emerged as an extremely popular form
of assisted reproductive technology3 (ART) in recent decades.4 Embryo cryopreservation was first successfully attempted in 1984 in the
case of Zoe Leyland, the first baby to be born from a frozen embryo.5
In Leyland’s case, the embryo was frozen for two months, but since
the inception of the practice of cryopreservation after successful IVF,
embryos have successfully survived in cryopreservation for extensively
longer periods of time, even spanning decades.6 The implications of
freezing embryos are therefore long-term, as demonstrated by the
case of Molly Everette Gibson.7 Gibson was a child born from the
viable pregnancy of her mother who used an embryo, which had been
stored in a cryogenic freezer for twenty-seven years.8
1. See NAT’L CANCER INST., Embryo Cryopreservation, https://www.cancer.gov/publications/
dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/embryo-cryopreservation (last visited Apr. 14, 2022) (defining
“embryo cryopreservation” as “[t]he process of freezing one or more embryos to save them for
future use”).
2. See CLEV. CLINIC, IVF (In Vitro Fertilization), https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/treatments/22457-ivf (last visited Apr. 16, 2022) (“In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a type of assisted
reproductive technology (ART) where sperm and an egg are fertilized outside of the human
body.”).
3. See CDC, What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, https://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html,
(last visited Apr. 16, 2022) (defining “ART” to include “all fertility treatments in which either
eggs or embryos are handled. In general, ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from
a woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the
woman’s body or donating them to another woman.”).
4. Susan L. Crockin & Gary A. Debele, Legal Issues Surrounding Embryos and Gametes:
What Family Law Practitioners Need to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 55, 55–59 (2018).
5. Sarah Zhang, A Woman Gave Birth from an Embryo Frozen for 24 Years, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/12/frozen-embryo-ivf-24-years/
548876/.
6. Id.
7. Marisa Iati, Meet Molly, the Baby Who Came from an Embryo Frozen When Her Mom Was
a Year Old, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle /2020/12/03/
embryo-frozen-27-years-ago-live-birth.
8. Id.
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This Comment analyzes two of the current approaches taken by Illinois courts in disputes regarding embryo allocation upon divorce or
separation of the parties and proposes a new “Hybrid Approach,”
which better balances the interests of parents and potential children.
Under the proposed “Hybrid Approach,” Illinois courts ought to treat
embryos as a unique or interim form of property when determining
their disposition in a legal dispute. This is because embryos are unlike
other forms of personal property or marital assets due to their potential to be utilized by either party in order to have a biological child.
Part II provides a brief background on embryo cryopreservation
and discusses the two current approaches to embryo allocation taken
by Illinois courts.9 Part II also provides information on approaches
taken by other jurisdictions.10 Part III proposes that Illinois courts
adopt a “Hybrid Approach,” which incorporates elements of the approaches taken by courts in other jurisdictions along with elements
from the multi-factor test currently employed by Illinois courts in
child custody disputes.11 This Part also discusses the relative merits of
the current Illinois approaches in comparison to the proposed “Hybrid Approach.”12 Finally, Part IV discusses the impact that employing the proposed “Hybrid Approach” will have on Illinois courts.13
II.

BACKGROUND

The practice of embryo cryopreservation has become exceedingly
popular, especially in recent years.14 While the original purpose of
freezing embryos was to help heterosexual couples who struggled with
infertility, the practice has become an increasingly common avenue to
start a family for homosexual couples, single women, and surrogates.15
Freezing embryos affords individuals flexibility and greater ability to
plan their future families. Prior to successful attempts to effectively
freeze embryos for later use, individuals were limited in their options
to IVF, whereby sperm and egg are combined in a lab to create the
embryos, and each embryo is immediately implanted into the
mother.16 In contrast, cryopreservation enables embryos to be stored
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Elena Berton, Same-Sex Couples and Singles Use of Fertility Treatment Hits UK Record,
REUTERS (May 9, 2019, 9:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-fertility-lgbt/samesex-couples-and-singles-use-of-fertility-treatment-hits-uk-record-idUSKCN1SF1QH.
15. Id.
16. Zhang, supra note 5.
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for an extensive period of time.17 Individuals may then choose the
proper time to use the embryos as well as elect to use only one embryo at a time while saving the others for later use.18 Doing so reduces
the possibility of conceiving twins or triplets, thus allowing parents to
exercise greater control over their vision for their families.19 Additionally, embryos may be tested and manipulated to eliminate genetic
diseases.20
While embryo cryopreservation has become an increasingly popular
form of ART characterized by great scientific developments over the
years,21 how to handle embryo allocation in the event of divorce or
separation of couples is a broadening and still less developed area of
the law, which continues to present challenges for the courts.22 Politicians, state legislatures, and courts grapple with a multitude of legal
issues surrounding families created using fertility treatments in view of
divergent moral, political, and legal discourse throughout the United
States.23
When it comes to the legal treatment of embryos in the event of
divorce or separation of a couple, disputes exist among “professionals
working in the assisted reproduction field, policy makers, and the public . . . whether embryos are persons, property, or something in between . . . .”24 The Supreme Court has never directly answered the
question of how to categorize embryos, but in light of its tradition of
declining to afford fetuses legal standing as judicial persons,25 it is very
likely that embryos would not receive legal standing as persons either.
Moreover, no state court has “declared an ex utero embryo to be a
person.”26 However, at least one state legislature enacted legislation
declaring embryos to be legal persons.27 In Louisiana, a statute provides that an embryo is “a biological human being which is not the
property of the physician who acts as an agent of fertilization, or the
facility which employs him or the donors of the sperm or ovum.”28
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 57.
21. Id. at 56–59.
22. See generally id.
23. Id. at 61.
24. Id. at 67.
25. Id. at 73.
26. Id.
27. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (2021); see id. § 9:123 (stating that “[a]n in vitro fertilized human
ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the
womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law”).
28. Id. § 9:126.
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Moreover, various state courts have characterized embryos as, at the
very least, a unique form of property, or “in some cases, sui generis,
stating they are deserving of special treatment . . . .”29 Other states,
including Illinois, treat embryos strictly as property subject to allocation under principles of contract law.30
A. Emergence of the Illinois Approaches
In Illinois, courts generally treat embryos as marital assets for purposes of allocation upon divorce.31 Illinois is an “equitable distribution state,” meaning that courts divide marital property fairly between
parties.32 However, such equitable property division is complicated by
marital property which cannot be clearly divided or which lacks monetary value.33 Embryos constitute a unique form of marital property
not clearly subject to equitable distribution, specifically because they
lack monetary value.34 Moreover, in the event of either divorce or
separation of unmarried couples, dispositional agreements35 and informed consent contracts36 are of paramount importance to the courts
in determining the manner in which embryos will be allocated.
Illinois courts employ at least two clear approaches to determine
allocation when parties dispute the custody of their embryos upon
separation.37 The courts first seek to enforce any contractual language
governing the allocation of the embryos.38 If no dispositional contract
29. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 68.
30. See generally Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d
1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
31. L. OFFICE VINCENT C. MACHROLI, P.C., Who Gets Custody of the Frozen Embryos in an
Illinois Divorce? (July 13, 2017), https://www.machrolilawoffice.com/oak-park-lawyer/ who-getscustody-frozen-embryos-illinois-divorce [hereinafter Who Gets Custody?].
32. L. OFFICE NICHOLAS W. RICHARDSON, P.C., How Are Frozen Embryos Handled During
an Illinois Divorce Case? (June 7, 2019), https://www.nickrichardsonlaw.com/palatine -divorceattorney/how-are-frozen-embryos-handled-during-an-illinois-divorce-case [hereinafter How Are
Frozen Embryos Handled?].
33. Id.
34. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 68.
35. Sarah Holman Loy, Responding to Reber: The Disposition of Pre-Embryos Following Divorce in Pennsylvania, 122 PA. ST. L. REV., 545, 564 (2018) (by entering into a dispositional
agreement, in the event of separation or divorce, couples can generally provide for: “(1) the
destruction of cryopreserved pre-embryos; (2) the donation of pre-embryos for research; or (3)
the utilization of the pre-embryos, enabling one party to have a child”).
36. Mary Beck, Frozen Pre-embryo Practice in Missouri, 75 J. MO. B. 126 (2019) (informed
consent contracts are typically provided by fertility treatment centers to inform individuals who
intend to cryopreserve embryos of their respective rights and options, which might include
“length of storage; thawing with destruction; donation to each other, to other family members, to
another family, or to science; and potential triggers for such options, such as length of lime,
pregnancy, death, or divorce”).
37. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
38. Id.
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exists, courts instead employ a balancing test weighing the parties’ interests.39 The Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 now mandates that
couples enter into dispositional agreements before choosing to cryopreserve their embryos. However, if no such agreement is created,
the key Illinois case of Szafranski v. Dunston provides the balancing
test that courts use to determine embryo disposition.
1. Illinois Parentage Act of 2015
The Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act) contemplates
situations in which parties, represented by independent legal counsel,
enter into contractual agreements regarding the allocation of their
embryos.40 However, the Parentage Act does not contemplate situations in which parties failed to enter into a written agreement regarding allocation. As a result, in Illinois, there is no uniform rule to
determine the outcome of disputes regarding the allocation of embryos when the parties have not entered into a dispositional agreement. However, one balancing approach has been elucidated from the
key decision by the Illinois Appellate Court in Szafranski v. Dunston,
which was decided prior to the enactment of the Parentage Act.41
Since the Parentage Act now requires that parties enter into contractual agreements regarding allocation,42 when possible, Illinois courts
still seek to enforce the contractual intent expressed in agreements
signed by the parties, either at the medical facilities where the embryos were created, or separately with the assistance of counsel.43
However, if no agreement was signed, the courts will employ the balancing test proffered in Szafranski to determine allocation.44
2. Szafranski v. Dunston
Szafranski v. Dunston exemplifies the main approach taken by Illinois courts with respect to embryo allocation.45 In Szafranski, the
plaintiff, Jacob Szafranski, and the defendant, Karla Dunston, disputed who would control the disposition of the couple’s frozen embryos.46 The couple was dating at the time they elected to freeze their
embryos through cryopreservation.47 Karla had been diagnosed with
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d
750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1137.

§ 46/703(a) (2017).
at 1136–37.
§ 46/703(a).
at 1136–37.
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lymphoma, and prior to receiving cancer treatment, she desired to
preserve her chances of fertility by going through the IVF process and
subsequently freezing the embryos.48 Karla and Jacob acknowledged
that neither expected the relationship to result in marriage, but nonetheless, the couple agreed to complete the process of IVF.49 Karla was
nervous about the prospect of using a sperm donor, and thus, Jacob
elected to fertilize her eggs, expressing his desire to help Karla one
day have children.50
Prior to going through with IVF, the medical facility required the
couple to sign an informed consent document (Informed Consent).51
The medical facility encouraged the couple to either enter into a coparenting agreement or a sperm donor agreement.52 The couple then
met with an attorney who explained that under a co-parenting agreement, both individuals would be “involved in any resulting child’s life
as a co-parent, including sharing financial responsibility.”53 On the
contrary, “under a sperm donor agreement, Jacob would have no obligations and would be waiving his parental rights.”54 Karla later asked
the attorney to prepare a co-parenting agreement, but ultimately, the
couple never signed the agreement.55 Shortly after Karla began chemotherapy, Jacob ended the relationship and proceeded to send a number of emails expressing his desire that Karla not use the embryos.56
Jacob believed that Karla’s use of the embryos would damage his relationship with his long-term girlfriend with whom he had gotten back
together and who had given him an ultimatum that she would end the
relationship if Karla used the embryos.57 However, Karla emphasized
that if she had known previously that Jacob had concerns regarding
her use of the embryos, she would not have fertilized all of her eggs
but rather would have frozen some in order to ensure that she had the
chance of having a biological child.58 As a result, Karla’s only chance
of having a biological child was to use the embryos, which necessarily
required Jacob’s genetic involvement.59
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1137.
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1139.
Id. at 1140–41.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1162.
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The issue presented for the court was which party was entitled to
control the disposition of cryopreserved embryos that were created by
the unmarried parties.60 Ultimately, the court awarded Karla sole custody of the embryos, conducting two separate analyses to arrive at its
conclusion.61 The court reasoned that based on an:
[E]xtensive survey of Illinois law and that of other jurisdictions involving similar disputes . . . disputes over the disposition of preembryos created with one party’s sperm and the other party’s ova
should be settled by: (1) honoring any advance agreement entered
into by the parties, and (2) weighing the parties’ relative interests in
using or not using the pre-embryos in the event there is no such
agreement.62

Therefore, the court first found that the parties had entered into an
oral contract as well as a medical informed consent contract, which
made clear that Jacob desired that Karla would be able to use the
embryos in the future without requiring Jacob’s consent.63 Jacob argued that his prior approval was required for Karla to use the embryos pursuant to the terms of the Informed Consent signed at the
medical facility.64 The Informed Consent stated “[e]mbryos are understood to be your property, with rights of survivorship. No use can be
made of these embryos without the consent of both partners (if applicable).”65 The relief sought by Jacob was effectively to incorporate a
limitation into the oral agreement, which would change the fundamental essence of the oral contract.66 The court disagreed with Jacob’s
interpretation of the language contained in the Informed Consent and
found that the language did not contradict the oral agreement.67
The Informed Consent contemplated that the couple would enter
into a separate agreement with respect to disposition of the embryos
upon separation.68 The court interpreted the missing language from
the Informed Consent regarding disposition of the embryos upon separation as a purposeful omission, reasoning that “[i]f this provision
was intended to be an expression of the parties’ dispositional intent, it
would contain language more reflective of a choice . . . .”69 Provided
that the parties had not signed the draft co-parenting agreement and
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1147, 1157.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1137.
Id. at 1136–37.
Id. at 1148, 1153–54, 1161.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1151.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
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had acknowledged their informed consent, the court pointed primarily
to principles of contract law in upholding the original intent of the
parties in their oral agreement.70
The court ultimately held that Karla was entitled to use the embryos
to have a child, without limitation, based on the oral agreement between the parties.71 Furthermore, the Informed Consent neither contradicted nor modified the parties’ oral agreement.72 The court did not
determine the enforceability of the draft co-parenting agreement because the oral agreement was sufficient in demonstrating the parties’
agreement that Karla could use the pre-embryos without Jacob’s consent.73 This focus on the oral agreement illustrates the first approach
taken by the court: enforcing any contractual language surrounding
the allocation of embryos.
Alternatively, the court employed a balancing test and ruled in
favor of Karla because Karla’s interest in using the embryos prevailed
over Jacob’s interest in preventing Karla from using the embryos.74
The court noted that a balancing test would be necessary in absence of
a contract expressing the parties’ intent.75 The court considered Jacob’s interest in preventing Karla from using the embryos due to the
detrimental impact it would have on his future relationships.76 However, the court reasoned that Karla’s interest in using the embryos was
more persuasive because she lost her fertility during chemotherapy.77
Although the court held in Karla’s favor based on the couple’s intent
expressed in the original oral agreement, the court reasoned that in
the absence of a prior agreement, Karla’s interest in using the embryos would nonetheless have outweighed Jacob’s interest to the
contrary.78
Szafranski remains the key Illinois case in embryo disposition jurisprudence, and in absence of federal or state regulation or any test
posited by the Illinois Supreme Court, a variety of issues remain to be
addressed by the Illinois courts. Nonetheless, Szafranski offers the approach regarding embryo allocation that Illinois courts tend to follow.79 Szafranski is also illustrative of the approaches taken in other
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1157, 1162.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1136–37.
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jurisdictions, which tend to use some combination of what this Comment refers to as the “Contractual Approach” and the “Balancing-ofInterests Approach.”
B. The Contractual Approach
Under the Contractual Approach, courts look strictly to any existing dispositional contracts entered into by the parties to determine
the manner in which embryos will be allocated in the event of a dispute.80 Principles of contract law govern this line of decision making,
and thus, courts enforce contracts as binding when there is an offer,
acceptance, and a meeting of the minds between the parties regarding
the terms of the agreement.81 Of paramount importance under the
Contractual Approach is the original intent of the parties expressed in
their original agreement, whether that agreement is oral or in
writing.82
The Contractual Approach is exemplified by the decision of the intermediate New York appellate court in Finkelstein v. Finkelstein. In
Finkelstein, a couple froze their embryos prior to divorce.83 The parties disputed the allocation of those embryos, as the husband no
longer wished for the wife to be able to use them.84 The parties had
signed an informed consent document with the fertility clinic, which
provided that they “consent[ed] to the cryopreservation of embryos
for [their] own use.”85 Further, the document provided that either or
both parties could “withdraw [their] consent and discontinue participation at any time . . . .”86 The court determined that the husband had
effectively withdrawn his consent.87 Despite the wife’s plea to use the
embryos, which represented her only chance at having a biological
child, the court decided to enforce the contract and determined that
neither party could use the embryos.88 The court ordered the fertility
clinic to destroy the embryos pursuant to the informed consent
agreement.89
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Loy, supra note 35, at 552–53.
Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1147.
Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 75.
Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 162 A.D.3d 401, 401–02 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403–04.
Id.
Finkelstein, 162 A.D.3d at 404.
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C. The Balancing-of-Interests Approach
Under the Balancing-of-Interests Approach, courts “look at and
weigh each party’s interests in either use, preservation, donation, or
destruction of the embryos, rejecting the requirements of contractual
enforcement and mutual consent.”90 This approach is applied in combination with the Contractual Approach in some jurisdictions or simply as an alternative approach if no dispositional contract was created
by the parties.91
The Balancing-of-Interests Approach is exemplified by the Tennessee Supreme Court decision Davis v. Davis. In Davis, the parties
elected to freeze their embryos but failed to enter into a dispositional
contract regarding their allocation.92 In absence of such a written
agreement, the Tennessee Supreme Court employed a balancing test
whereby it decided that the husband’s interest in not procreating outweighed the wife’s interest in using the embryos to conceive a child.93
The court stressed that the wife could still have a biological child by
some other means, such as adoption or IVF with a donor.94
In another case demonstrating the Balancing-of-Interests Approach, A.Z. v. B.Z., a married couple went through several rounds of
IVF and created a series of dispositional agreements along with each
cycle.95 The agreements allocated the frozen embryos to the wife if the
parties divorced.96 However, when the parties eventually separated,
the court refused to enforce the agreements, reasoning that it would
not force procreation upon one party if that party no longer wished to
become a parent.97 The court balanced the parties’ interests and determined that the husband’s interest in not becoming a parent prevailed over the wife’s interest in using the embryos.98 Thus, the court
effectively required that the parties display mutual consent to use or
discard the embryos at the time of the dispute rather than simply enforcing the express intent of their original contracts, meaning the
court completely disregarded the Contractual Approach.99
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 87.
See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 604.
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
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D. Focus on the Rights of Intended Parents
This Comment addresses only those situations in which both parties
have contributed sperm and egg to create the embryos, as opposed to
those situations in which a donor is used to provide the sperm or egg.
Thus, this section addresses the rights of “intended parents,” as opposed to “donors,” within the meaning of the Parentage Act.100 The
Parentage Act provides that an “intended parent” is “a person who
enters into an assisted reproductive technology arrangement . . . under
which he or she will be the legal parent of the resulting child.”101 In
contrast, the Parentage Act provides that a “donor” is:
[A]n individual who participates in an assisted reproductive technology arrangement by providing gametes and relinquishes all
rights and responsibilities to the gametes so that another individual
or individuals may become the legal parent or parents of any resulting child. “Donor” does not include a spouse in any assisted reproductive technology arrangement in which his or her spouse will
parent any resulting child.102

With married couples, one party may not be considered a donor,103
but when parties are unmarried, this distinction is often made clear by
both parties entering into a dispositional contract regarding embryo
allocation in the event of separation.104 As explained in Szafranski,
two typical dispositional contracts utilized with respect to frozen embryos are co-parenting agreements and sperm donor agreements.105 A
co-parenting agreement typically provides that both parties are “involved in any resulting child’s life as a co-parent, including sharing
financial responsibility.”106 On the contrary, a sperm donor agreement
typically provides that the donor shares “no obligations and would be
waiving his parental rights.”107
III.

ANALYSIS

The predominant approach currently employed by Illinois courts in
embryo allocation disputes upon divorce or separation is to enforce
the original intent of the contracting parties (the Contractual Approach).108 However, when no such dispositional agreement or in100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 46/103(i), (m-5) (2015).
Id. § 46/103(m-5).
Id. § 46/103(i).
Id.
See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1136–37.
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formed consent contract exists, the courts tend to employ a balancing
test (the Balancing-of-Interests Approach).109 In Illinois, there lacks a
clear statutory response to the ambiguities created by situations in
which no written dispositional agreements were made by parties.
Thus, if the courts employ the Balancing-of-Interests Approach to determine allocation, there is no statutory guidance with respect to parental rights, which creates insufficiencies.
Part III weighs the relative merits of the two approaches employed
by Illinois courts and proposes a modified “Hybrid Approach” to
remedy these insufficiencies by better accounting for the long-term
implications that judicial determinations on embryo allocation have
on potential parents and children.110
A. Shortcomings of the Contractual Approach
The Contractual Approach employed by Illinois courts suffers from
serious shortcomings; embryos “unlike homes and cars – have no
monetary value. Further, they can become a financial liability for the
other parent, should the ‘custodial’ party decide to use the embryos to
conceive a child.”111 The current approach taken by Illinois courts
fails to consider the long-term implications which accompany custody
determinations for frozen embryos.112
This Comment proposes that Illinois courts ought to treat embryos
as a unique or interim form of property when determining their allocation in a legal dispute because of the long-term legal implications
for both parties in the event that one party utilizes the embryos to
have a biological child.113 This Comment does not contend that embryos ought to be afforded legal standing as persons. If this were the
case, disputes regarding embryo allocation would necessarily be determined solely based on the Illinois “best interests of the child” standard,114 ultimately preventing any consideration of the original intent
of the parties expressed in their dispositional contract.
Determining the proper allocation of embryos touches on a variety
of areas of law. For example, affording embryos legal standing as per109. Id.
110. See infra Part II.
111. Who Gets Custody?, supra note 31.
112. Stacie Provencher, Family Law—States Should Create a Heightened % Standard of Review for Contracts That Determine the Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Contested Divorce
Cases %, 42 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 295, 310 (2020).
113. Id. at 298.
114. Kimberly Anderson, Illinois Best Interests of the Child Factors: What Are They Really?,
ANDERSON & BOBACK (Mar. 8, 2017), https://illinoislawforyou.com/illinois-divorce/childs-bestinterest-factors-illinois/.
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sons would determine whether individuals who do not wish to use
their frozen embryos technically “donate” the embryos to scientific
causes or give them up for “adoption.”115 In Davis, the court adopted
the judicial definition of “embryo” articulated by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, which stated that embryos were
“neither persons nor property,” but “potential life deserving of special
respect and protection . . . .”116 Similarly, Illinois courts should recognize the unique nature of embryos because of their distinct potential
to become human beings. However, this definition should stop short
of affording embryos the same status as that of a legal person while
still imposing special treatment and additional respect on embryos in
the context of custody disputes. For Illinois courts to implement special treatment of embryos, it is necessary to develop a new approach
to account for embryos’ enhanced or “interim” status in the context of
custody disputes.
Moreover, the Contractual Approach is arguably beneficial because
it promotes judicial efficiency and predictability for litigants in this
area of the law. On the other hand, the Contractual Approach
presents challenges for courts when contracts are poorly drafted and
when courts must “discern intent from a fill-in-the-blank clinic
form.”117 The shortcomings of the Contractual Approach ultimately
outweigh any potential benefits. Often, parties fail to enter into any
written dispositional agreement with respect to embryo allocation, as
was the case in Szafranski.118 Although the Parentage Act now requires that such agreements be made,119 it is unclear who bears the
responsibility of assuring the existence of such an agreement: whether
it is the responsibility of the medical facility or of the parties with
assistance of independent legal counsel.
Furthermore, the Contractual Approach lacks a strong component
of consequentialism. A consequentialist approach to judicial decision
making would consist of a “normative evaluation of particular actions
or rules depend[ing] on an analysis of consequences . . . .”120 A strong
public policy argument exists that contractual intent should not be the
only or even the primary consideration in determining suitable allocation of embryos upon divorce or separation. The court should instead
evaluate the long-term impact of the ruling on the physical, emotional,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
HARV.

Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 67.
Id. at 68.
Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 84.
See generally Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 46/703(a) (2017).
Note, Rights in Flux: Nonconsequentialism, Consequentialism, and the Judicial Role, 130
L. REV. 1436, 1437–38 (2017).
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and financial wellbeing of the parties involved as well as of any prospective child.121
The shortcomings of the Contractual Approach are exemplified in
the Finkelstein decision, which demonstrates that, under the Contractual Approach, the interests of the parties are not considered.122
Rather, the main factor considered by the court is the original intent
of the parties at the time they entered into the contract.123 Further,
the Contractual Approach fails to account for the complexities posed
by scientific developments in the field of ART. For example, as the
field of ART advances, embryos may be stored for decades,124 and
thus, parties’ circumstances may dramatically change by the time one
or the other party wishes to use the embryos. It is highly plausible that
the parties’ original intent when they signed a contract will have
changed completely, and therefore, this intent should be only a relatively minor consideration or perhaps no longer a consideration at all
in determining the suitable allocation of embryos upon divorce or
separation.125
B. Shortcomings of the Balancing-of-Interest Approach
While the Balancing-of-Interests Approach is a step in the right direction toward ensuring judicially sound embryo allocation determinations, this approach does not yet fully account for the long-term
implications of such determinations. As demonstrated in Szafranski,
when Illinois courts employ the Balancing-of-Interests Approach,
only the interests of the parties are weighed in determining embryo
allocation.126 Such a result is insufficient because, while embryos do
not have legal standing as persons, the embryos very well may give
rise to the existence of a person.127 Therefore, given the unique nature
of embryos in their capacity as property,128 courts ought to balance
the interests not only of the two parties creating the embryos, but also
the interests of any prospective child(ren) to be born as a result of one
party’s use of the embryos.
There are a variety of reasons supporting the claim that a prospective child’s interests should be weighed by courts in determining em121. Provencher, supra note 112, at 310–12, 319.
122. Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 162 A.D.3d 401, 403–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
123. Id. at 403.
124. Iati, supra note 7.
125. Provencher, supra note 112, at 309.
126. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1147 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
127. Jon Johnson, Embryo Freezing: What You Need to Know, MEDICALNEWSTODAY (Mar.
13, 2019), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/314662.
128. Provencher, supra note 112, at 298.
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bryo allocation. For example, if a court fails to consider the best
interests of the future child(ren), the court may allocate the embryos
to a party who lacks sufficient financial, emotional, or physical capabilities to properly care for a child. Rather, as demonstrated in
Szafranski, the court might weigh only two interests: (1) a party’s interest in procreation, and (2) a party’s interest in not being forced to
procreate.129 An allocation determination based only on these two
factors is simplistic, and a prospective child may suffer as a result.
Therefore, based on the shortcomings of both the Contractual Approach and Balancing-of-Interests Approach, Illinois courts must employ a modified approach to properly determine embryo allocation in
the event of divorce or separation.
C. Proposed Hybrid Approach to Mitigate Shortcomings
A proper alternative approach to treating embryos strictly as property is reached by first acknowledging the unique nature of embryos.130 In the event of divorce, marital assets are subject to
equitable distribution in Illinois.131 Thus, a court considers a variety of
factors in deciding how to distribute assets, such as the age, health,
and financial resources of the parties.132 A court’s determination regarding the distribution of marital assets entails long-term implications as one or both parties ultimately may lose an asset in which they
vested strong personal value. However, when courts are tasked with
allocating embryos by either enforcing contractual intent or by balancing the interests of only the parties, a variety of issues unique to the
parties in their capacity as biological parents arise. For example, a scenario might arise in which married parties contractually agree to cryopreserve embryos because of the wife’s possible infertility. In the
event that the parties decide to allocate the embryos to the husband
upon divorce and the court opts to simply uphold that original contractual intent, harm may be suffered not only by the parties but also
by the prospective child. Specifically, the wife stands to lose the possibility of ever having a biological child, and the child may be placed in
the custody of a parent that is less fit to care for his or her needs. An
appropriate approach to embryo allocation may be characterized as a
hybrid between the two current approaches employed by Illinois
129. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1136–37.
130. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 69.
131. How Are Frozen Embryos Handled?, supra note 32.
132. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/503(d)(8)
(2016).
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courts combined with certain elements of the Illinois “best interests of
the child” test.
Moreover, as previously discussed, this Comment proposes that embryos constitute a unique form of property due to their potential to
give rise to life.133 Thus, when determining how embryos ought to be
allocated, it is proper for a court to consider factors affecting the wellbeing of a prospective child if one or both parents have custody.
Against the backdrop of the parties’ original contractual intent, Illinois courts ought to weigh the interests of both parties as well as those
of the prospective child(ren) when determining how embryos are
allocated.
As demonstrated in Szafranski, Illinois courts consider at least two
factors when balancing the interests of the parties: (1) an infertile
party’s interest in being able to have a biological child, and (2) a
party’s interest in not being forced to procreate.134 Factors found in
the Illinois “best interest of the child” test, as set forth in the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, are helpful for shaping the
proffered Hybrid Approach.135 The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act provides various factors, which “weigh heavily in determining parenting time and responsibility allocations when those are
in dispute.”136
While a proper determination of custody of a living child depends
on the court’s balancing of each of the factors laid out in the Parentage Act, for purposes of establishing the Hybrid Approach for determining embryo allocation, the following factors from the Act are most
relevant: (1) the wishes of the parents with respect to parenting time;
(2) “the mental and physical health of all individuals involved”; (3)
“the child’s needs”; (4) the ability of the parents to cooperate in the
arrangement; (5) the threat of physical violence by the child’s parent;
(6) “the willingness and ability of each parent to place the needs of the
child ahead of his or her own needs”; (7) “whether one of the parents
is a convicted sex offender or lives with a convicted sex offender”; and
(8) “any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.”137
By applying the above-mentioned factors from the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act to the Hybrid Approach, Illinois
courts will be obligated to conduct a balancing test with respect to the
133. Catherine Wheatley, Arizona’s Torres v. Terrell and Section 318.03: The Wild West of
Pre-Embryo Disposition, 95 IND. L.J. 299, 305–06 (2020).
134. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1162.
135. 750 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.7.
136. Anderson, supra note 114.
137. Id.; 750 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.7.
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prospective child(ren)’s interests in addition to balancing the interests
of the parties.
Employing a balancing test that considers the future child’s interests
promotes the likelihood of familial stability and ensures that children
will be cared for by capable parents. For example, balancing the factor
of “the child’s needs”138 allows the court to assess if one party will be
financially able to support a child or if child support from the other
party will be necessary. Further, the court will be able to place prospective children in safer living situations by preventing the allocation
of embryos to a potentially dangerous party, such as an individual
convicted of a sexual crime. The court might also look to the criminal
background of one of the parties to assess the “threat of physical violence”139 by the parent.
The Hybrid Approach ultimately affords courts greater flexibility as
they strive to make proper allocation determinations of frozen embryos. While the Contractual Approach to these disputes should not
be entirely abandoned, the contractual intent of the parties should be
merely one factor for consideration under the balancing test of the
Hybrid Approach. The Hybrid Approach emphasizes the importance
of balancing the interests of both parties as well as the interests of any
prospective child(ren) rather than simplistically enforcing the original
intent of the contracting parties to a dispositional agreement. Nonetheless, under the Hybrid Approach, the parties’ express original intent is still given weight in determining a proper allocation in the case
that a dispositional agreement was validly entered into by both
parties.
Overall, the proposed Hybrid Approach to determining the allocation of frozen embryos upon divorce or separation properly takes into
consideration the legal implications of treating embryos not merely as
property akin to real estate or personal possessions, but rather, as a
unique category of property necessitating special treatment.140 Embryos “occupy an interim category between mere human tissues and
persons because of their potential to become persons.”141 As a result,
determinations regarding their allocation should be made with an eye
toward the long-term implications presented by one party receiving
the embryos, the embryos being destroyed, or the embryos being ordered to remain in storage.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Anderson, supra note 114.
Id.
Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 68.
Id.
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IV. IMPACT
The Hybrid Approach to the allocation of frozen embryos presents
a variety of benefits as well as challenges for Illinois courts and litigants. The ultimate impact of the Hybrid Approach is to promote equitable outcomes in disputes regarding the allocation of embryos as
well as to promote stability among families created through ART. Admittedly, the proposed Hybrid Approach fails to promote judicial efficiency due to the complex, multi-factored considerations that must be
addressed by the courts. Additionally, because express contractual intent will no longer remain the predominant factor in Illinois embryo
custody determinations, attorneys practicing in this area will be compelled to prepare increasingly complex contracts to promote their clients’ interests in the event of future litigation. However, the
complexities and associated burdens which accompany application of
the Hybrid Approach might encourage legislative response in this
area of the law.142 Overall, the benefits to be enjoyed by those affected families outweigh the administrative difficulties imposed on Illinois courts and litigants because of the importance of preventing
judicial decisions based strictly on principles of contract law in this
highly personal area of the law.
The Hybrid Approach takes into consideration the effects of scientific developments in the field of ART.143 Specifically, given that embryos are able to be cryopreserved for decades in some cases,144 the
Hybrid Approach accounts for changes in the ultimate desires of the
parties with respect to procreation. The Hybrid Approach makes it
more likely that a party who no longer wishes to become a parent may
avoid the consequences of any contractual obligations he or she may
have entered into decades ago. Further, the interim property status of
embryos under the Hybrid Approach does not preclude a determination that the embryos should be thawed and discarded by fertility clinics when such action is deemed appropriate and necessary by the court
or the involved parties. Ultimately, the Hybrid Approach tends to
prevent the issue of “forced procreation”145 upon a party who does
not desire to be a parent. That party would then be freed from a variety of financial obligations and potential social consequences he or
she might have faced if the original dispositional contract was
enforced.
142. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Embryo Disposition Disputes: Controversies and Case
Law, 46 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 16 (2016).
143. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 55–59.
144. Zhang, supra note 5.
145. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 104.
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Additionally, the Hybrid Approach promotes equity in disputes between homosexual couples, only one of which may have provided
their sperm or egg in creating the embryos. The parental rights of a
non-biological homosexual parent is likely to give rise to debate in this
area, especially as “the central question of the law of parentage has
been when and to what extent determinations of legal parenthood
should be based on biological relationship, marriage to a child’s biological parent, or functioning as or intending to be a parent.”146 A
party who is not genetically related to the embryo but who nonetheless relied on use of the embryo as an avenue to start a family gains a
better chance to become a parent under the Hybrid Approach. Thus,
the Hybrid Approach would promote more equitable results in disputes over allocation of embryos than if the courts strictly employed
the Contractual Approach.
If the court balances the interests of the parties and those of the
prospective child and, in fact, the interests of the non-biological “intended parent” and the child would be best served by awarding sole
custody to that intended parent, such a determination might override
any original contractual language that alone would have prevented a
custody award to the non-biological parent. The Hybrid Approach
aligns with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
wherein the Court “assumed that both members of the same-sex married couple would in fact be parents of the children, even though in all
same-sex situations, only one of the spouses can be directly genetically
related to the child.”147 Application of the Hybrid Approach to embryo allocation determinations between homosexual couples promotes equitable outcomes against the backdrop of Obergefell.
Moreover, by applying the Hybrid Approach, Illinois courts will
better address matters which have for too long been improperly decided based primarily on principles of contract law. By incorporating a
balance among the parties’ original intent, the interests of the parties,
as well as the interests of the prospective child(ren), the courts will
secure stability for families while preventing the use of embryos as a
tool for harassment. The area of law surrounding embryo allocation
disputes is one that has been outpaced by medicine,148 and by applying a more flexible approach to such decisions, the courts will promote
the welfare of parties and prospective children, despite the uncertainty posed by litigating these disputes on the basis of a balancing
test.
146. Id. at 78–79.
147. Id. at 79; see generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
148. Crockin & Debele, supra note 4, at 59.
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V. CONCLUSION
Given the highly personal nature of the law surrounding embryo
allocation disputes, Illinois courts ought to employ an approach that is
sensitive to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. This
area of law remains largely unsettled across jurisdictions as fundamental disagreements persist even as to the proper categorization of embryos – human life, property, or an interim category?149 As previously
shown, the allocation of embryos upon divorce or separation has implications that last a lifetime not only for the parties to the arrangement, but also for any prospective children.
Moreover, when parties dispute embryo allocation, Illinois courts
determine allocation by first seeking to enforce the contractual agreement with respect to embryo allocation (the Contractual Approach),
and then, if no such agreement exists, engaging in a balancing test to
determine the interests of the parties (the Balancing-of-Interests Approach).150 However, the shortcomings of both approaches are elucidated when considering the long-term implications of a custody
determination made without regard to the best interests of the child.
Thus, it is essential that courts take a consequentialist approach (the
Hybrid Approach) for decisions in this area of the law by balancing
the interests and welfare of a child that does not yet – and may never
– exist. By taking this Hybrid Approach, courts will ensure that children are placed in better positions in the future while clarifying the
parental rights and responsibilities of the parties.
As scientific developments in the field of ART progress and the
manner in which families are created becomes increasingly complicated, the law must respond with an equally flexible and sensitive approach. Ultimately, the proposed Hybrid Approach in this Comment
helps achieve that end by providing a clear, multi-factored test that
not only considers the original contractual intent of the parties, but
also the best interests of both the parents and the potential child at the
time of a dispute.
Andrea Howell

149. Id. at 75.
150. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).

